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Abstract 
 In this study, we present evidence which strongly suggests that personal income tax 
evasion has been an increasing function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax 
rate over the period 1970-2008, which constitutes the most current data currently available on 
aggregate personal income tax evasion. This evidence leads us to conclude that the federal 
personal income tax increases implemented effectively in 2013 under provisions of American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 will 
result in increased tax avoidance behavior. Among other things, this public-policy-induced 
increase in personal income tax evasion implies that the federal budget deficits in coming years 
will be greater than projected by the CBO and various government agencies. We also find that 
tax avoidance activity is an increasing function of the unemployment rate, the interest rate yield 
on three year Treasury Notes, and per capita real GDP (adopted as a measure of per capita real 
income), and a decreasing function of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (during its first two years of 
being implemented), the IRS audit rate, and the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high 
grade municipals to the interest rate yield on ten year Treasury Notes. Thus, there is also 
evidence that persistently high unemployment rates may increase tax evasion and the size of 
federal budget deficits, although increasing the audit rate by IRS personnel may raise tax 
compliance to some extent.  
 
Introduction 
 
In this study, we present evidence to suggest that personal income tax evasion is an increasing 
function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, for the period 1970-2008. 
This evidence leads us to logically conclude that the federal personal income tax increases 
implemented effectively in 2013 under provisions of American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 and 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 will result in increased tax avoidance 
behavior. Hence, it follows that this public-policy-induced increase in personal income tax 
evasion implies that the federal budget deficits in coming years will be greater than projected by 
the CBO and various government agencies. Interestingly, our analysis also suggests that tax 
avoidance activity is an increasing function of the unemployment rate, the interest rate yield on 
three year Treasury Notes, and per capita real GDP (adopted as a measure of per capita real 
income), and a decreasing function of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (during its first two years of 
being implemented), the IRS audit rate, and the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high 
grade municipals to the interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. Consequently, there is also 
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evidence that persistently high unemployment rates may further continue to elevate tax evasion 
and the size of federal budget deficits, although increasing the audit rate by IRS personnel may 
raise tax compliance to some extent.  
Income tax evasion effectively is the reduction of taxable income caused by unreported or 
underreported revenue or the inclusion of fictional tax deductions. Studies of income tax evasion 
behavior essentially fall into three categories. First, there are theoretical models of tax evasion 
behavior, such as Allingham & Sandmo (1972), Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, & Spurr (1991), 
Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, & Slutsky (1994), Caballe & Panades (1997). Second, there 
are a number of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or (b) undertake experiments, such as 
Spicer & Lundstedt (1976), Spicer & Thomas (1982), Baldry (1987), Alm, Jackson, & McGee 
(1992), Thurman (1991), and Alm, McClelland, & Schulze (1999). These studies are empirical in 
nature, deriving the data largely (if not entirely) from the experiments.  
Certain of these studies indicate an aversion to the prospect of being audited while others 
reveal a lack of such risk-averse behavior; still others imply that taxpayers may be averse to tax 
evasion on moral grounds. Additionally, the incentive to evade taxation by underreporting income 
provided by higher marginal income tax rates is also revealed in numerous studies.  
Third, there are those studies that largely or in some cases exclusively adopt what is referred 
to as "official data,” i.e., data obtained from the IRS (or its counterpart outside of the U.S.) and/or 
some other “official source,” i.e., a government source, and/or from a publicly available source. 
Among, the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data on income tax evasion, 
income tax rates, and audit rates. Such studies endeavor typically either to estimate the aggregate 
degree of tax evasion or to identify the determinants thereof (Tanzi,  1982, 1983; Clotfelter, 1983; 
Carson, 1984; Long & Gwartney, 1987; Pyle, 1989; Feinstein, 1991; Erard & Feinstein, 1994; 
Feige, 1994, 1989, 1996; Cebula, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011; Ali, Cecil, & Knoblett, 2001; Ledbetter, 
2004; Alm & Yunus, 2009; Cebula & Coombs, 2009; Choi and Johnson, 2014).    
In this literature, it is widely believed that the degree of federal personal income tax evasion 
in the economy as a whole is positively affected by income tax rates (Tanzi (1982); Clotfelter 
(1983); Feige (1994)). Interestingly, Yaniv (1994) characterizes Clotfelter (1983) as “the most 
relevant study” with respect to the impact of income tax rates on tax evasion. This perspective is 
simple: the higher the income tax rate, the greater the benefit (in terms of a reduced tax liability) 
from not reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus.  
The maximum marginal tax rate was relatively high from 1970-1986 as can be seen in 
Table X. This table also shows that tax rates were lower from 1987 to 2014.  The Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 (TRA) initiated a period of lower tax rates and lowered the highest marginal tax rate 
from the 50% rate of 1986 to 38.5% for 1987 and 28% for 19881. The 28% rate remained the 
highest rate through 1990. For 1991 and 1992, the highest rate was increased to 31%; followed 
by an increase to 39.6% for 1993 where it remained the highest rate through the year 2000. On 
January 1, 2001 the rate was reduced slightly to 39.1% and on January 1, 2002, it was reduced to 
38.6%. 
For the next full decade the individual income tax rate schedules remained the same with 
the highest marginal rate of 35% (2003-2012). This ten-year period was the longest period of 
                     
1 The highest marginal rate of 28%, effective January 1, 1988, was the smallest top rate since 
1931, a period of 58 years. 
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stability in the individual tax rates, from top to bottom brackets, since 1913. The Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), amplified and accelerated by the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) fixed the highest marginal 
tax rate at 35%2.  The 2001 and 2003 tax acts made significant cuts in overall individual tax rates 
but were set to expire at the end of 2010.   
There was significant speculation that tax rates would increase soon after the Obama 
administration took office in 2008; however, the 35% rate was extended as the highest marginal 
tax rate until 2011, along with all the lower bracket rates remaining the same, by the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010.  The American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 increased the top marginal tax rate, effective January 1, 2013, back 
to 39.6%, the highest rate for the years 1993-2000 and the highest rate in the period of 1987-
2014.  This 2014 highest tax rate of 39.6% is effectively higher due to the increases in other taxes 
on income earners. 
Effective January 1, 2013, a new additional tax was implemented as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)3 intended to significantly increase the tax on the 
wealthy by adding an additional tax of 3.8% on the lower of net investment income or modified 
adjusted gross income over thresholds of $250,000 and $200,000 for married filing joint and 
single, respectively. This new tax is in addition to the regular income tax at the higher marginal 
rates of 2014 or the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), if the AMT is higher than the regular tax. 
Another provision of PPACA initiates an additional Medicare tax of .9% on wages and self-
employment income over the $250,000/$200,000 thresholds. The additional Medicare tax 
increases rate on the higher income from 2.9% to 3.8%. In addition, if taxable income exceeds 
the 35% rate and falls into the 39.6% bracket, then capital gains are increased to 20%, rather than 
15%. Consequently, after relative stability and expectations of lower tax rates brought about by 
the TRA 1986, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act have caused a maximum marginal tax rate could range from 39.6% to as 
much as about 48%, a rate very close to the maximum rate before implementation of TRA 1986.  
In this work, we add to the rich literature on income tax evasion by seeking to identify 
key determinants of federal personal income tax evasion using data up to and including the year 
2008. We also show that the seemingly innocuous tax rate increases in 2013 and 2014 are quite 
debilitating when taken together and will, without doubt, after a significantly long period of 
stability of tax liabilities, result in an increase in the incentive to evade tax. By investigating tax 
evasion through 2008, the study period is more current than the existing published literature and 
provides a reasonable framework to analyze the Obama tax increases. The conclusions also 
generate significant implications for future federal budget deficits and the growth rate of the 
national debt  
The model is presented in Section II. In Section III we provide the formal empirical 
analysis, whereas Section IV provides concluding observations.   
                     
2 The tax rates from this legislation were the lowest rates since the 28% top rate in the 1988-
1990 tax years. 
3 "Public Law 111–148". 111th United States Congress. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office. March 23, 2010. Codified as amended at scattered sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) and in 42 U.S.C. 
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The Model 
 
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic agent will not report 
his/her taxable income to the IRS is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits 
to the agent of not reporting income, eb, and as a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to 
the agent of not reporting income, ec. Thus, the ratio of the probability of not reporting income to 
the IRS, pnr, to the probability of reporting income to the IRS, (1-pnr), is described for the 
representative economic agent by: 
 
(1) pnr/(1-pnr) = f(eb, ec), feb > 0, fec < 0        
 
Expressing probabilities in relative terms such as shown in equation (1) possesses the virtue that it 
thereby reflects the form of the tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described below in Section III) 
the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion is expressed in such relative terms.  
As already observed, the gross expected benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are 
hypothesized to be an increasing function of the federal personal income tax rate (Tanzi, 1982; 
Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994). To reflect the federal personal income tax rate, this study adopts the 
maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate (MAXT). This measure of the income tax rate 
is adopted because it can be argued that it not only is an actual income tax rate but also reflects to 
some degree the degree to which income tax rates are progressive. Accordingly, it is hypothesized, 
ceteris paribus, that: 
 
(2) eb = g(MAXT), gMAXT > 0         
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) may have been perceived by at least some portion of 
the general public as an honest, good faith effort to reform, i.e., to simplify and increase the equity 
of the Internal Revenue Code. As Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
is the most sweeping reform since the early 1940s…” TRA did introduce a number of reforms, 
many of which are outlined in Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), Ott and Vegari (2003), 
and Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed in Ott and Vegari (2003, p. 
279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the personal tax rate. When fully effective (1988) only two 
tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent were to replace the 14 bracket tax schedule with rates in the 
range of 11 to 50 percent...[while it] broadened the tax base by reducing the itemized deduction.” 
Musgrave (1987, p. 59) further observes that prior to the TRA, a slow erosion of the income tax 
base had been occurring. Musgrave (1987, p. 57) was particularly dismayed by the widening of tax 
loopholes and the emergence of high income tax shelters that had “…gained momentum in recent 
years and undermined the public’s faith in the income tax.” 
Because of the finding of previous researchers such as Musgrave (1987, p. 59) asserted that 
the TRA “…reversed these (high tax) trends, a major accomplishment that all reformers will 
welcome.” Based on Musgrave’s (1987) arguments, as well as the findings from Cebula, Coombs, 
and Yang (2009), and the obvious dramatic decline in tax rates starting in 1987, and the period of 
low tax stability from 2003-2008 as shown in Table X, it is expected that taxpayers will have 
favorably regarded the TRA and been less resentful of the Internal Revenue Service than before, at 
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least initially. Thus, it is hypothesized that at the time the TRA was enacted and becoming effective 
(1986-1987) and also received the greatest publicity, reduced taxpayer resentment of the federal 
income tax system/Internal Revenue Service would, at least temporarily, have resulted in a reduced 
degree of aggregate personal income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. Consequently, it is hypothesized 
here that, for the period when the TRA was initially implemented, 1986, through the year the TRA 
became “de facto fully effective,” 1987 (Barth, 1991; Barth and Brumbaugh, 1992), the eb was 
reduced. Accordingly, (2) above is replaced by (3): 
 
(3) eb= j(MAXT, TRA), jMAXT > 0, jTRA <0  
  
 Next, as in Alm and Yunus (2009), it is expected that the higher the unemployment rate 
(UN), the greater the degree of aggregate income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. This is based on the 
reasoning that the higher the UN level, the greater the extent to which the unemployed work in the 
“underground economy” and do not report income. Moreover, this effect may be reinforced to the 
extent that higher unemployment creates an incentive to engage in income tax evasion even for 
still-employed people to the degree that they try to covet extra funds (by under-reporting income) in 
the event of a possible lay-off. Furthermore, the higher the real income level (INC), the greater the 
degree to which tax evasion is hypothesized in this study to occur, ceteris paribus, because higher 
income persons will tend to have greater access to and greater knowledge of ways in which to 
reduce income tax liabilities. For example, many individuals with higher income report income on 
one or more Schedule C forms, a practice which often-times provides an opportunity to under-
report income (Ali, et al., 2001). Individuals with higher income arguably also have greater access 
to specialized tax lawyers and accountants who may enable them to more efficiently “limit” tax 
liabilities. Thus, equation (3) can be replaced by equation (4), as follows: 
 
(4)   eb= j(MAXT, TRA, UN, INC), jMAXT > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0 
 
Next, following Cebula (2004), it can be argued that the greater the ratio of tax free interest 
rate yields on high grade municipals relative to taxable interest rate yields such as that on 10-year 
U.S. Treasury notes, TFTEN, the greater the benefits of tax avoidance, which is legal, and hence the 
less the expected benefits of tax evasion, which of course is illegal. Thus, (4) is replaced by (5): 
 
(5) eb= j(MAXT, TRA, UN, INC, TFTEN), jMAXT > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jTFTEN < 0 
 
 Finally, the higher the interest rate yield on bonds in the marketplace, the greater the 
opportunity cost of tax compliance. Alternatively stated, the higher the interest rate yield on 3-year 
Treasury notes (THREE), the greater the benefits that could be derived from investing funds not 
reported to the IRS Hence, eb is hypothesized to be an increasing function of THREE, so that: 
 
(6) eb= j(MAXT, TRA, UN, INC, TFTEN, THREE), jMAXT > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, 
  jTFTEN < 0, jTHREE > 0 
 
This introduction of a variable to expressly represent the opportunity cost of tax compliance from 
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the expected benefit side of the tax evasion decision calculus is unique to tax evasion studies 
using official data for the U.S.  
The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS are hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, et al., 1994; Erard and Feinstein, 
1994; Caballe and Panades, 1997). In this study, to the representative economic agent, the expected 
risks/costs from not reporting or from underreporting taxable income to the IRS are enhanced by an 
increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns that is formally 
audited by IRS examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax audit 
could imply non-pecuniary ("psychic") costs as well as pecuniary costs (including outlays for legal 
or other representation, along with the value of one's own time) above and beyond any potential 
added taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. This study adopts the probability of a 
formal audit as a measure of risk to the would-be tax evader. Ideally, IRS penalty assessments could 
also be adopted as a measure of the risk associated with tax evasion; unfortunately, a dependable 
and complete set of penalty data is not available for all the years in the study period. Thus, we have:  
 
(7) ec = j(AUDIT), jAUDIT > 0       
 
Substituting from (6) and (7) into (1) yields:  
 
(8) pnr/(1-pnr) = eb= b(MAXT, TRA, UN, INC, TFTEN,THREE, AUDIT) 
 bMAXT > 0,bjTRA <0,bjUN > 0,bjINC > 0, b jTFTEN < 0, bTHREE > 0, bAUDIT < 0    
  
Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in 
the economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy, and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It reasonably follows overall that: 
 
(9) UAGI = (pnr)*AGI                    
 
and 
 
 (10) RAGI = (1-pnr)*AGI           
 
It then follows that: 
 
(11) UAGI/RAGI = (pnr)*AGI/(1-pnr)*AGI = (pnr)/(1-pnr)     
 
From (7), (8), and (10), substitution for pnr/(1-pnr) in (1) yields: 
 
(12) UAGI/RAGI = j(AEPT, TRA, UN, INC, TFTEN,THREE, AUDIT) 
 jMAXT > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jTFTEN < 0, jTHREE > 0, jAUDIT < 0  
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Empirical Results 
 
Based on the framework provided in (12) above, the following reduced-form equation was 
estimated: 
 
(13) (UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 MAXTt-1 + a2 TRAt + a3 UNt-1 + a4 INCt-1 + a5 TFTENt-1  
+ a6 THREEt-1 + a7 AUDITt-1 + u               
where: 
  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to 
the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
MAXTt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as a 
percent; 
TRAt= a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 and 1987: TRAt=1 for the years 1986, 1987 
and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
UNt-1= percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in year t-1;   
INCt-1 = per capita real GDP in year t-1 (expressed in year 2000 dollars); 
TFTENt-1 = the ratio of the average interest rate yield on high grade tax free municipal bonds in year 
t-1 to the average interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes in year t-1, expressed as a 
percentage; 
THREEt-1 = the average interest rate yield on 3-year Treasury notes in year t-1, expressed as a 
percentage; 
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
The study period runs from 1970 through 2008, reflecting availability of the data used in the 
analysis. The first estimation is an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimation, is expressed in log-log 
form; the log-log specification has the advantage of being very easily interpreted. In the interest of 
testing for robustness and consistency of the initial results, as well as in the quest for potential 
additional insights, two additional (alternative) estimates of the model are provided for the 1970-
2008 period, the first a GLM (Generalized Linear Model, Gamma family) and the second a GLM 
(Normal Family).  
The data are annual. The data for MAXT were obtained from the Internal Revenue Service 
(2010, Table 6). The AUDIT data were obtained from the Government Accounting Office (1996: 
Table I.1) and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994, Table 519; 1998, Table 550; 1999, Table 556; 2001, 
Table 546; 2010, Table 469). The TRA variable is a dummy variable; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
was actually signed into law by President Reagan in 1986. The data for the variables UN, INC, 
TFTEN, and THREE were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2009, Tables B-42, 
B-41, B-73).The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the 
variable (UAGI/RAGI), were obtained from Feige (2012). Based on the General Currency Ratio 
(GCR) model, Feige (2009) estimated the ratio of aggregate unreported adjusted gross income to 
aggregate reported adjusted gross income, using a 1973 IRS estimate for this ratio as the baseline in 
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his computations. These data are provided in Table 1. For the interested reader, descriptive statistics 
for the study period for each of the variables are found in Table 2. 
The log-log OLS estimate of equation (13) is provided in the first column of Table 3. In this 
estimate, all seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs. Furthermore, three of 
these estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, one is statistically 
significant at the 2.5 percent level, two are statistically significant at the five percent level, and one 
(TFTEN) is statistically significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 
0.68, so that the model explains nearly seven-tenths of the variation in the independent variable. 
Based on the DW and Rho statistics, there is little concern regarding autocorrelation. Finally, the F-
statistic is statistically significant at the one percent level, attesting to the overall strength of the 
model. 
According to the results provided in Table 3, the coefficient/elasticity on the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax variable (MAXT) is positive and statistically significant at the 
one percent level. Thus, as expected, the higher the maximum marginal federal personal income tax 
rate, the greater the expected benefits of tax evasion and hence the greater the extent of that income 
tax evasion. This finding is consistent with most previous studies of income tax evasion using 
official data (Ali, et al., 2001; Cebula, 2004; Klepper, et al., 1991; Tanzi, 1982, 1983). 
Quantitatively speaking, a ten percent increase in the maximum federal marginal tax rate (i.e. from 
30% to 33%) would be expected to increase federal personal tax evasion (as measured) by about 2.8 
percent. 
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, et al. (2009), the 
results for TRA variable are compelling. In particular, the estimated coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Thus, there is evidence that the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. 
Given the specification of TRA as applying to the short-term period of just 1986 and 1987, these 
results would seem to confirm the prior findings by Cebula, et al. (2009), who argue that it would 
take at least some time for taxpayers to understand the revisions in the Internal Revenue Code and 
to adjust to those revisions. For the years 1986 and 1987, it appears that federal personal income tax 
evasion fell by 17 percent, ceteris paribus. 
The estimated elasticity on the unemployment variable is positive, as hypothesized, and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Thus, there is strong evidence that the higher the 
unemployment rate, the greater the extent of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion. This 
finding is compatible with the recent findings in Alm and Yunus (2009). The present findings imply 
that a ten percent increase in the unemployment rate (i.e. from 10% to 11%) elevates federal 
personal income tax evasion by nearly 1.9 percent. 
Next, the estimated elasticity on the per capita real GDP variable (INC) is positive, as 
hypothesized, and statistically significant at the one percent level. This finding appears to confirm 
our hypothesis that the degree of aggregate federal personal income taxation is greater at higher 
levels of taxable income. In other words, the higher the real income level (INC), the greater the 
degree to which tax evasion is expected to occur, ceteris paribus, plausibly because individuals 
with higher income will tend to have greater access to and knowledge of ways in which to avoid 
income taxes. For example, many individuals with higher income report income on one or more 
Schedule C forms, which often-times provide an opportunity to under-report income and/or over-
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report expenses (Ali, et al., 2001). In addition, higher income persons also may have greater access 
to specialized tax lawyers and accountants who may enlighten them as to how to more efficiently 
both avoid (and evade) tax liabilities. A ten percent increase in INC would appear to raise income 
tax under-reporting by about 5.2 percent. 
The estimated elasticity on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is negative, as 
expected, and statistically significant at the eight percent level, providing modest evidence that the 
greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured here), the less the degree of illegal tax 
evasion (Cebula, 2004). In this estimate, a ten percent increase in the TFTEN ratio would reduce 
under-reported income by about 2.7 percent. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on TFTEN is 
statistically significant at beyond the five percent level in the two GLM estimates shown in Table 3. 
The elasticity on the variable THREE is positive and statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Thus, it appears that the greater the opportunity cost of personal income tax 
compliance, as measured by a higher taxable interest rate (in this case, the annual federally taxable 
interest rate yield on 3-year Treasury notes), the greater the degree of income tax evasion. Such a 
finding is unique in studies of aggregate income tax evasion in the U.S. In any case, the results 
indicate that a ten percent rise in the 3-year Treasury note yield would raise income under-reporting 
by about 1.1 percent. 
Finally, there is the audit variable. As shown in the first column of Table 3, the estimated 
elasticity on this variable is negative and statistically significant at beyond the five percent level. 
Thus, it appears that the audit rate (AUDIT) variable, of and in itself, may be viewed as an effective 
deterrent to federal personal income taxation. This finding is consistent with previous studies such 
as Cebula (2001), who suggests that IRS policies such as penalties and interest charges, as well as 
improving income-detection technology, are important tax-evasion disincentives. In this case, a ten 
percent increase in the audit rate (by IRS personnel) would be expected to reduce under-reporting of 
income by about 1.3 percent. 
In econometrics, the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) is a flexible generalization of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model that allows response variations that have error 
distribution models other than a normal distribution. The GLM generalizes linear regression models 
by allowing the linear model to be related to the response variable by way of a link function and 
permitting the magnitude of the variance of each measurement to be a function of its predicted 
value. In effect, GLS models are an iteratively reweighted least squares method for maximum 
likelihood estimation of the parameters of a regression model; GLS modeling allows for a broader 
version of linear regression.   
To test the robustness of the conclusions of the model developed above, that model was 
estimated using the GLM, first with the family category “Gamma” and then with the family 
category “Normal.” Dispersion was computed using the Pearson Chi-Square, whereas coefficient 
variance was computed using the observed Hessian. In the Gamma case, convergence was achieved 
after six iterations, whereas in the Normal case, convergence was achieved following only one 
iteration. As shown in the second and third columns of Table 3, qualitatively speaking, the results 
from the two GLS estimations are entirely compatible with the log-log OLS estimation results. 
Indeed, the results for the TFTEN variable are arguably even stronger (more robust) in the GLM 
estimates. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In 2013, federal personal income tax increases were implemented under provisions of 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010. Based on our analysis of the data for the time period 1970-2008, we believe the incentive to 
engage in tax evasive activities will have increased as a direct consequence of public policy. Using 
data for the time period 1970-2008, we have strong evidence to suggest that federal personal 
income tax evasion is an increasing function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax 
rate.  
Tax evasion is also an increasing function of the percentage unemployment rate of the 
civilian labor force, per capita real income, and the annual interest rate yield on 3-year Treasury 
notes (as a measure of the opportunity costs of tax compliance). The study also finds, somewhat 
surprisingly, that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 acted to briefly discourage tax evasion, whereas it 
was not a surprise that a higher IRS audit rate by IRS personnel acted to discourage tax evasion. 
Furthermore, the greater the benefits of legal tax avoidance, as measured by the ratio of the tax free 
interest rate yield on high grade municipals to the taxable interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury 
notes, the less the degree of illegal tax evasion. Subsequent related research might seek to identify 
additional factors influencing income tax evasion in the U.S., as well as to investigate the 
possibility of simultaneity issues between tax evasion and other variables. 
In any event, the persistence of high unemployment rates (although they appear to have 
abated somewhat in recent months), in conjunction with implemented higher federal tax rates (and 
President Obama has vowed to raise those income tax rates further so that the “wealthy will pay 
their fair share”), will realistically lead to a pattern of increased federal budget deficits and a more 
rapidly growing national debt. Ultimately, the impacts of these latter phenomena will lead to higher 
real interest rates and diminished private sector investment in new plant and equipment. Our 
expectation is a reduction in economic growth, and an increase in unemployment due to the lost 
productive efficiency.   
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Table 1. Data for Dependent Variable, UAGI/RAGI, by Year, 1960-2008 
 
Year UAGI/RAGI   Year UAGI/RAGI 
1960 16.10    1985 21.11 
1961 15.47    1986 18.89 
1962 15.86    1987 17.42 
1963 16.44    1988 18.74 
1964 15.88    1989 21.06 
1965 14.62    1990 21.06 
1966 14.86    1991 21.39 
1967 15.36    1992 19.04 
1968 15.21    1993 17.70 
1969 15.32    1994 17.98 
1970 16.30    1995 20.01 
1971 16.04    1996 18.64 
1972 16.16    1997 18.66 
1973 16.27    1998 18.30 
1974 17.47    1999 20.55 
1975 18.81    2000 22.29 
1976 20.17    2001 22.73 
1977 20.37    2002 23.94 
1978 20.63    2003 23.17 
1979 21.14    2004 21.57 
1980 22.84    2005 21.98 
1981 22.25    2006 23.85 
1982 22.93    2007 24.90 
1983 21.46    2008 23.94 
1984 21.86 
 
UAGI/RAGI is expressed as a percentage. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1970-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    20.159  2.423 
MAXT    47.56  15.53 
TRA    0.0513  0.224  
UN    6.132  1.35 
INC    27,833  6,181 
TFTEN   89.9  10.9 
THREE   6.87  2.85  
AUDIT    1.362  0.54 
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Table 3. Empirical Estimates, 1970-2008 
 
Variable  OLS  GLM   GLM 
             (Log-log) (Family: Gamma) (Family: Normal) 
a0   -5.93  -------   -------     
 
MAXT   0.281*** 0.119***  0.535**    
   (3.89)  (4.01)   (2.35) 
 
TRA   -0.17*** -2.76***  -2.72*** 
   (-2.98)  (-2.99)   (-2.73) 
 
UN   0.189** 0.526**  0.535** 
   (2.58)  (2.41)   (2.35) 
 
INC   0.518*** 0.00058***  0.00059*** 
   (5.52)  (8.97)   (8.80) 
 
TFTEN  -0.268# -5.658*  -5.786* 
   (-1.72)  (-2.01)   (-2.03) 
 
THREE  0.111*  0.405***  0.374*** 
   (2.00)  (3.65)   (3.37) 
 
AUDIT   -0.133* -1.586*  -1.68* 
   (-2.07)  (-2.01)   (-2.04) 
 
R2   0.68  -------   ------- 
AdjR2   0.61  -------   ------- 
F   9.18*** -------   ------- 
DW   1.88  -------   ------- 
Rho   0.05  -------   ------- 
Convergence after 
Iteration  -------  6   1 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the one percent level; 
**indicates statistical significance at the 2.5 percent level; *indicates statistical significance at the 
five percent level; # indicates statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 4. 
 
Income Tax Rates 
 Year  Maximum   Minimum 
1970 71.75 0.0% 
1971
4
 70.0% 0.0% 
1972 70.0% 0.0% 
1973 70.0% 0.0% 
1974 70.0% 0.0% 
1975 70.0% 0.0% 
1976 70.0% 0.0% 
1977 70.0% 0.0% 
1978 70.0% 0.0% 
1979 70.0% 0.0% 
1980 70.0% 0.0% 
1981 69.125% 0.0% 
1982 50.0% 0.0% 
1983 50.0% 0.0% 
1984 50.0% 0.0% 
1986 50.0% 0.0% 
1987 38.5% 11.0% 
1988 28.0% 15.0% 
1989 28.0% 15.0% 
1990 28.0% 15.0% 
1991 31.0% 15.0% 
1992 31.0% 15.0% 
1993 39.6% 15.0% 
1994 39.6% 15.0% 
1995 39.6% 15.0% 
1996 39.6% 15.0% 
1997 39.6% 15.0% 
1998 39.6% 15.0% 
1999 39.6% 15.0% 
2000 39.6% 15.0% 
2001 39.1% 15.0% 
2002 38.6% 10.0% 
2003 35.0% 10.0% 
2004 35.0% 10.0% 
2005 35.0% 10.0% 
2006 35.0% 10.0% 
2007 35.0% 10.0% 
2008 35.0% 10.0% 
2009 35.0% 10.0% 
2010 35.0% 10.0% 
2011 35.0% 10.0% 
2012 35.0% 10.0% 
2013 39.6% 10.0% 
2014 >39.6%
5
 10.0% 
   
  
                     
4 From 1971 – 1980, although the highest marginal rate was 70%, the highest rate on “earned 
income” varied considerably. Thus the was not the stability of the decade 2003 through 2012. 
5 The highest marginal rate for 2014 will be higher than 39.6% due to the additional tax 
provision on the Affordable Care Act of 2010 which are effective January 1, 2014. 
